An intrusion is defined as any set of actions that attempts to compromise the integrity, the confidentiality, or the availability of a resource. 1 Following the pioneering work of Anderson in 1980 2 it has been recognised that while computer systems and networks need to be protected from unauthorised external access, using firewalls for example, it is not possible to provide an unconditional guarantee of invulnerability to intrusion. There are a number of reasons for this. One is the extreme diversity of intrusions observed, for example password stealing and cracking, masquerade and sniffer attacks, subversion of security controls (via trapdoors, Trojans etc), denial of service attacks, and malicious codes (viruses, worms, Trojans, logic bombs etc). 3 Another reason is that over 70 per cent of attacks on networks are believed to be internal in origin. 4 Thus while the traditional information security approach of Protect, Detect, React is still relevant, the impossibility of providing guaranteed protection for information systems in a networked environment increases the importance of detection in order that appropriate reactive measures can be implemented. Detection is a crucial element both in terms of information security for individual networks and also in terms of the development of an Indicators and Warnings system for detecting a large scale attack on a network of networks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are therefore becoming an increasingly important tool, all the more so in the light of a DISA study showing that 96 per cent of systems managers are unaware that they have suffered an intrusion. 5 At the core of any IDS is a method for analysing the behaviour of users to detect anomalies or misuse. A number of methods have been applied to this problem, and these methods form the basis of a classified scheme or taxonomy.
TAXONOMY
It is convenient to divide IDS into ADS (Anomaly Detection Systems) and MDS (Misuse Detection Systems). ADS are based on the assumption that there exists a normal activity profile for a system, and that any statistically significant deviation from this profile represents the occurrence of an intrusion. Since an ADS assumes that any anomalous activity is necessarily intrusive, it may flag nonintrusive anomalous activities and miss non-anomalous intrusive activities. MDS on the other hand are based on the assumption that it is possible to represent individual known attack strategies as patterns or signatures which can be looked for. An MDS (like many anti-virus programs) is ineffective against hitherto unknown intrusion strategies and hence needs regular updating. Since an MDS looks for individual patterns or signatures it is possible that subtle variants of a known intrusion strategy may be missed, or tha non-intrusive activity may be flagged due to fortuitous similarity to a known pattern or signature. In summary, one may say that an MDS tries to recognise known intrusive behaviour while the ADS looks for deviations from normal behaviour.
IDS can be further subdivided into 'passive' and 'reactive' categories. A passive IDS performs its analysis essentially off-line, leaving a post hoc summary of its findings. A reactive IDS must perform its analysis in real time so that appropriate reactive measures can be taken on-line.
Both ADS and MDS can be classified in terms of the analysis strategies they employ. For ADS three principal approaches used are statistical profiles, predictive pattern generation, and neural networks. With statistical approaches a behaviour profile is generated for each subject initially and the deviation of the actual behaviour from the profile is continually monitored. Predictive pattern generation attempts to predict future actions from sequences of post actions using a set of rules with attached probabilities, and flagging as intrusions outcomes which deviate greatly from the prediction. Neural networks can be trained to predict a user's next action given the sequence of previous actions, using a training set comprising representative user commands or actions.
For MDS six major approaches are keystroke monitoring, rule-based, model-based, state-transition analysis, pattern-matching, and control-loop measurement. Keystroke monitoring simply monitors a user's keystrokes for known attack patterns. The rule-based approach uses an expert system containing a rules database encoding different known intrusion scenarios and takes its raw input from the system audit trail or log file. By contrast, the model-based approach assumes that a given intrusion scenario can be inferred from the observation of certain specific actions, and comprises three components -an anticipator which attempts to predict the next step in the current scenario from the knowledge base of scenario models; a planner which translates this hypothesis into audit trail behaviour; and an interpreter which searches the audit trail for this behaviour. The state-transition analysis approach analyses the state transitions made by the system as it runs and detects intrusions in terms of the guard conditions which have to be fulfilled for the system to move from a safe state to a compromised one. The pattern-matching model encodes known user intrusion signatures as patterns and then matches these against the incom ing audit trail data. Finally the control-loop model views the activities of a focused external intruder as a control loop, characterised by observability and controllability, and applies DSP (digital signal pro cessing) techniques to the time series data gener ated by the intruder's network traffic to generate the control loop signature.
Further details of IDS techniques may be found in the references. 6 
TUNING
The degree of effectiveness with which an IDS operates depends on 'tuning' its performance to reduce the occurrence of 'false positives' (normal activities flagged as intrusions) and 'false negatives' (intrusion activities accepted as normal). This can be achieved by varying the threshold of the intrus ion detection criteria, since increasing the thresh old will reduce the false negatives while decreasing the threshold will reduce the false positives ( Figure   However , the costs associated with the occur rence of false positives and false negatives cannot realistically be assumed equal. With a false positive the cost is mainly in terms of system manager time required to establish that no intrusion has actually occurred. With a false negative the cost depends largely on the value of any information damaged or disclosed or of any consequent system unavail ability. Therefore:
cost (false positives) + ρ. (false negatives)
where ρ is the cost of a false negative relative to that of a false positive. The empirical results from modelling and surveys suggests that ρ 1 in most cases. This in turn implies that it is usually more important to reduce the number of false negatives in order to minimise the overall cost. The optimal threshold for intrusion detection is thus where the gradient of the false positives curve is -ρ times the gradient of the false negatives curve.
SUMMARY
A brief introduction to the various types of IDS has been given, together with an indication of the level of threat which has promoted their increasing importance. A simple qualitative model demon strates how tuning the detection threshold of an IDS is effective in reducing the occurrence of false nagatives and false positives so as to minimise their cost.
